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Abstract: Land markets, including land sales and short-term land rentals, have an important role to play 
for efficient and sustainable land management and agricultural development, especially where markets for 
other factors of production are imperfect or missing. This study utilises data from the highlands of 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda to examine the impact of land markets on various types of land investment 
and management practices, crop yield, and land quality. The results highlight the relative long-term 
versus short-term return to different types of investment and practices, where those with longer-term 
benefits such as trees, manuring, and composting are preferred on more tenure-secure plots, while those 
with immediate or season-to-season benefits such as drainage structures or chemical fertilizers are 
preferred on rented plots. The impact on agricultural productivity is mixed and context specific. 
Regarding land quality outcomes, there is reason to believe that plots traded on short-term markets in 
Kenya and Uganda tend to be of inferior quality, supporting the hypothesis of movement of land from 
households to those with higher capital/land ratios. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Land is naturally an important resource in agrarian economies and, thus, efficient land markets 
(including sales and rentals) are important for sustainable land management and agricultural 
development. Particularly, land markets allow land to be used by farmers who are more capable 
to earn the highest return from it, through mobility of scarce factors of production such as labour, 
draft power, implements, purchased inputs, and management ability. There is an old and large 
literature on land tenure contracts and their implications for agricultural efficiency.
1 Adam Smith 
(1776), John Stuart Mill (1848), Alfred Marshall (1890) and numerous authors since have argued 
that share tenancy causes inefficient resource allocation. The rationale being that the share tenant 
receives as marginal revenue only a fraction of the value of his marginal product of labor, thus 
reducing the tenant’s incentive to supply labor or other inputs at the optimal level, assuming that 
the tenant’s work effort cannot be monitored and enforced and there is no production 
uncertainty.
2 More recently, others have argued that if the tenant’s work effort can be costlessly 
monitored and enforced by the landlord, then resource allocation can be as efficient under 
sharecropping as under owner-cultivation or fixed-rent tenancy (Johnson, 1950; Cheung, 1969).
3 
Whether monitoring and enforcement of contracts are sufficiently costless to allow for 
efficient sharecropping is of course an empirical question. Not surprisingly, the available 
empirical evidence on the efficiency of alternative land tenure contracts is mixed. A review of a 
large number of case studies in South and Southeast Asia by Otsuka and Hayami (1988) and 
Otsuka et al. (1992) show that there is not much significant inefficiency associated with share 
tenancy. The few case studies in sub-Saharan Africa also show mixed evidence.
4 For example, 
while Pender and Fafchamps (2001) did not find significant inefficiency associated with rented 
plots, Gavian and Ehui (1998) found that total factor productivity was lower on rented than 
                                                                 
1 For excellent reviews, see Otsuka et al. (1992); Singh (1989); Otsuka and Hayami (1988); and Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig (1984). 
2 This is commonly referred to as the Marshallian inefficiency of sharecropping. 
3 Marshall himself noted this possibility even while arguing for the inefficiency of sharecropping. 
4 There is a substantial and growing literature investigating the impacts of land rights and land titles on agricultural 
productivity in Africa (Platteau, 1996), but little of it addresses the impacts of land tenure contracts.   2 
owner-operated plots. Similarly, Ahmed et al. (2002) found that crop yield was lower on 
sharecropped plots than on owner-cultivated plots, although they also found that crop yield was 
the same on fixed-rent and owner-operated plots. Holden et al. (2001), on the other hand, found 
that barley yield was about 51% higher on rented plots compared to owner-operated plots. 
Many of the studies, however, did not adequately distinguish sharecroppers from fixed-
rent tenants or owner-operators and/or control for other factors that may affect the efficiency or 
sustainability of land use such as land quality or differences in farmers’ endowments or abilities 
(Shaban, 1987). Several studies that did control for such characteristics have found evidence 
supporting the Marshallian perspective (Bell, 1977; Shaban, 1987; Sadoulet et al., 1994; Laffont 
and Matoussi, 1995; Chunrong Al et al., 1996; Ahmed et al., 2002), although inefficiency was 
not always found for all groups of farmers (Sadoulet et al., 1994), nor did it always mean lower 
input use or output per hectare on sharecropped land (Chunrong Al et al., 1996). Controlling for 
and examining the significance of the factors that capture the underlying arguments for the 
existence of different contractual arrangements, including risk and uncertainty (Cheung, 1969; 
Stiglitz, 1974; Reid, 1977), transaction and monitoring costs and incentive problems (Stiglitz, 
1974; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985; Pender and Fafchamps, 2001), and capital market constraints 
(Jaynes, 1982, 1984; Allen, 1985; Shetty, 1988; Laffont and Matoussi, 1995; Pender and 
Fafchamps, 2001), is particularly important from a policy perspective, i.e., to be able to prescribe 
policy recommendations for improving the efficiency of land markets or improving land 
management and agricultural productivity in a sustainable manner. 
Using community, household and plot level data from the highland areas of Ethiopia, 
Kenya and Uganda, we examine the efficiency and sustainability impacts of land markets in East 
Africa. The conceptual framework, data, and empirical approach are discussed next. This is 
followed in section 3 by a descriptive analysis of land markets and land use, productivity and 
quality. Results of econometric analyses are discussed in section 4, and conclusions and 
implications in section 5.   3 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Conceptual framework 
A conceptual model of the link between land markets, investment in land improvements, 
agricultural productivity, and land quality is given in Figure 1; appealing to the literature on 
property rights and investment incentives and the relative efficiency of alternative land tenure 
arrangements (including many of those cited in the introduction in addition to: Besley 1985; 
Feder, 1985; Feder and Feeny, 1993; Place and Hazell, 1983). 
In some cases, the effects of markets are similar whether the markets are for more 
permanent purchases of land or shorter term rentals. In other cases, the effects of land purchase 
and rental markets are expected to differ. Four main pathways are identified. The first, 
capitalization effect (in the upper left quadrant), is that land market activity will lead to greater 
capitalization of the value of investment into land values and, thus, provide increased incentives 
for longer term investment, notably visible and lumpy investments. This induced incentive effect 
would apply to all land in a community, assuming that all land would potentially be traded. The 
second, distribution effect (in the upper right quadrant), is that land markets may facilitate the 
movement of land resources to households with higher labor/land or capital/land ratios and, thus, 
increase investment and efficiency (and reduce the variance of yields across farms). This 
efficiency-increasing effect would be most observed on plots that were acquired via the market.  
The third is the tenure security effect (in the lower left quadrant) and posits that farmers who 
purchase land will have more incentive to title their land and privatize it away from local 
customary tenure arrangements that may impinge on investment decision making. On the 
contrary, rented plots are typically of limited duration and carry with them significant limitations 
in terms of investments that can be made by the tenant. The fourth effect is the asymmetric 
information effect, which hypothesizes that where investments are not capitalized into land prices 
and where land quality is difficult to assess, the types of land traded may be of inferior quality. 
This is likely to be much more the case for land rentals than land purchases, because the   4 
spontaneous nature of rental markets, along with the low price reduces information gathering 
efforts. If this is the case, then one would expect lower investment and productivity on traded 
plots, especially rented and borrowed plots. Thus, it is obvious that the overall effects of land 
markets on investment and efficiency are complicated. The effects of improved markets for land 
purchases are mainly positive.
5 The case of land rental markets is much less clear, with some 
positive and some negative linkages. 
Empirical approach 
Two types of empirical analyses are used to assess the impact of land markets on land use 
efficiency and sustainability. First, descriptive analysis of means and variances and statistical 
tests are used to examine differences in various indicators of land investment (e.g. stone terraces, 
trees, irrigation), land management practices (e.g. contour plowing, crop rotation, mulching, 
fertilization), crop yield, and land quality across different land acquisition methods. In the second 
approach, we use econometric techniques to examine the impact of the different types of plot on 
those same indicators. Here, we control for several other factors that may affect land investment, 
land management practices, crop yield, and land quality outcomes; including extension, type of 
crops planted, land operator’s technical knowledge and capacity (which is enhanced through 
education, farm experience, and access to services and markets), characteristics of the land (e.g. 
size, slope, soil depth), and natural factors (e.g. rainfall, elevation). Typically, we estimate the 
following four regression equations: 
1. Land investment = f (land markets; other factors) 
2. Land management = f (land markets, stock of land investments; other factors) 
3. Crop yield = f (land markets, stock of land investments, land management; other factors) 
4. Land quality = f (land markets, stock of land investments, land management; other factors) 
Depending on the nature of the dependent variable in equations 1 through 4, different 
econometric techniques are used for the estimation, including probit, tobit, and ordinary lease 
                                                                 
5 We have not discussed non-economic reasons for acquiring land, some of which may lead to over-accumulation 
and inefficient use of land.   5 
squares (Maddala, 1983; Greene, 1993). All the analyses were carried out using STATA 
software (StataCorp, 2006). The specifics are discussed in the relevant sections. 
Study sites and data 
We use survey data from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda to test the hypotheses outlined in the 
conceptual framework. The Ethiopia data are from community, household and plot level surveys 
that were conducted in the highland areas (above 1500 meters above sea level (m.a.s.l.)) of the 
Amhara and Tigray regions between 1999 and 2001. A stratified random sample of 99 peasant 
associations (PAs, usually consisting of three to five villages),
6 two villages (198 in total) 
randomly selected from each PA and four or five households (934 in total) randomly selected 
from each village, were selected from the highland areas of the two regions.
7 In addition, all 
plots operated by the selected households were surveyed, and the stratification was based upon 
indicators of agricultural potential, market access, and population density (Benin, 2006; Pender 
and Gebremedhin, 2006). Information were collected through structured surveys and include 
household structure and endowments, household’s access to infrastructure and services, plot 
characteristics (mode of acquisition, size, slope, quality, crops cultivated, etc.), land investments, 
land management practices, inputs, and agricultural production in 1999 and 2000 cropping 
seasons. Recall methods were also used to obtain information prior to 1999/2000, specifically 
1991. Data on altitude were collected using a global positioning system (GPS). The primary data 
were supplemented by secondary information on rainfall and population. 
The Kenya data are from a study of 943 households in 100 communities. The 
communities themselves are distributed across 15 districts in the Eastern, Central, Rift Valley, 
Nyanza, and Western provinces. All the sites fall within medium to high potential areas (i.e. 
rainfall above 800 mm per annum) and as such are potential maize growing areas, and indeed 
maize is grown in all of them. Here too a stratified random sample procedure, based on 
                                                                 
6 The peasant administration (called Kebele and Tabia in Amhara and Tigray region, respectively) is the lowest unit 
of government. 
7 PAs that are predominantly below 1500 m.a.s.l. in elevation or have more than 50% of their total area below 1500 
m.a.s.l. were excluded from the sample frame.   6 
indicators of agricultural potential, market access and population density, was used. Structured 
survey instruments were used to collect information on household agricultural activities such as 
cropping, livestock and tree growing, land acquisition and rights, and access to labor and capital. 
The study also measured soil quality through the sampling and analysis of soils from the major 
cereal fields, which was maize in all cases. Other information collected includes household 
assets, expenditures, income, demographics, education, and health. Community surveys were 
also used to assess the prevalence of livelihood and farming practices, land market activity, 
prices and wages. 
The data on Uganda come from three sets of surveys collected between 1999 and 2004. A 
stratified random sample of 270 communities (LC1s, the lowest administrative unit, usually 
consisting of a single village) and four to ten households (1426 in total) randomly selected from 
each village Here too, all plots operated by the selected households were surveyed and the 
stratification was based on indicators of agricultural potential, market access population density 
and altitude (Nkonya et al., 2004; Nkonya et al., 2005). The total number of plots surveyed was 
5391. At the household level, information collected includes household composition, 
endowments of assets, income and expenditures and adoption of agricultural and land 
management technologies. At the plot level, information collected includes land tenure, plot 
quality characteristics, land management practices, use of inputs and outputs from the plot in the 
year 2000. The survey information was supplemented by secondary information collected from 
the 1991 population census and available digitized map information incorporated into a 
geographic information system. 
3. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
3.1. Land markets, land rights and land values 
Ethiopia 
Prior to 1975, land tenure in Ethiopia was based on a feudal system in which land was owned by 
the emperor, who granted tenure rights subject to feudal obligations. Land tenure forms known   7 
as rist and gult were then practiced (Rahmato, 1984). The rist was a communal form of land 
ownership where an individual was entitled to usufruct rights in a commune if he or she could 
prove some blood relation to the founding patriarch of the commune. Usufruct rights were 
lifelong and extended over many generations. The gult was linked with the legal and political 
institutions of the crown and those involved, gultegnas, were responsible for levying and 
collecting tax from ristegnas, who tilled the land. Upon overthrow of the monarch, lands were 
nationalized and declared as the collective property of the people in the land reform proclamation 
of March 1975, and households were given use rights only, with occasional redistribution of 
farmland to accommodate landless households. Since 1991, under the current government of the 
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), households have been given the 
right to use the land indefinitely, lease it out temporarily to other farmers, and transfer it only to 
their children. However, they cannot sell or mortgage the land. Land redistribution has been 
phased out, except where major infrastructure investments such as irrigation necessitate 
redistribution. 
Leading up to the time of the data collection, however, there were significant differences 
across regions with respect to the implementation of land redistribution. For example, in the 
Tigray region, land redistribution was stopped in 1991, and the policy of no future redistribution 
was made official by a land use and tenure policy in 1997. In the Oromiya region too, there had 
not been a land redistribution since 1992 (Tefera et al., 2000). In the Amhara region, on the other 
hand, land redistribution was common, with the most recent major land redistribution taken place 
in 1997/98. There had been at least one land redistribution since 1991 in about 73% of the 
villages surveyed, with the average number being three. One of the villages interviewed had 
experienced as many as fourteen land redistributions since 1975. 
Compared to other countries, land is relatively equally distributed in the Ethiopian 
highlands because of the radical land reform program begun in 1975 (Rahmato, 1984; Bruce et 
al., 1994; Abate, 1995; Amare, 1995) and the continued prohibition of land sales and mortgages,   8 
a policy enshrined in the new Ethiopian constitution.
8 The data show that the average land 
holding per household is about 1.3 ha in the Amhara region and 1 ha in the Tigray region. 
However, the average farmland holding was significantly higher (about 75% more in the Amhara 
region) among male-headed households than their female counterparts. Up to 89% of the plots 
were cultivated by their owners, i.e., by those receiving the land directly from the government 
(peasant association) or through gift, inheritance, or permanent exchange (Table 1). The 
remaining 11% of the plots were obtained through temporary farmer-to-farmer exchanges in the 
form of rental, mostly sharecropping. Although both male and female headed households 
participate equally in the land rental market, the males tended to rent in more while females 
tended to rent out more. Contracts for rented plots were very short (one season or year on 
average) and equl sharecropping (one-half of crop output to landowner) was the common 
practice. For fixed leases, rents were about US$30–65 per hectare, depending on the quality of 
the land.
9 
Land rights associated with exchange, transfer, and making long-term investments were 
exclusive to owner-cultivated plots. There seem, however, to be a high level of restriction on 
rented plots even for simple activities such as crop choice and grazing animals. Tenants could 
not choose what type of crops to plant on 50% of the rented plots, while they could not graze 
their animals on 28% of the rented plots. Expectations to operate the plot in the next 5 or 10 
years or to bequeath the plot were almost perfect on owner-cultivated plots, but were between 20 
and 28% on rented plots.
10  The main reason for expecting not to operate the plot in the future 
was due to fear of land redistribution on owner-cultivated plots, especially in the Amhara region, 
and termination of rental contract or uncertainty of renewal of contract on rented plots. 
Kenya 
                                                                 
8 As a result of the predominant rist land tenure system that existed in northern Ethiopia prior to the 1975 land 
reform (which also involved periodic land redistribution and prohibited land sales and mortgages), land ownership 
was not greatly unequal in most places even before 1975 (Bruce et al., 1994). 
9 At the time of the surveys, US$ 1»Ethiopian Birr 8.50. 
10 On rented plots, bequeath refers to the expectation of transferring the rental contract to an heir in the event that the 
current contract holder is unable to continue farming.   9 
Table 1 also shows the distribution of plots according to the method of acquisition in Kenya. The 
majority of plots, 59%, were acquired through inheritance primarily and other permanent means. 
Compared to the Ethiopian case, however, a significant percentage was acquired through market 
mechanisms, with 26% being purchased, 14% being acquired through fixed-rent arrangements, 
and less than 1% being acquired through sharecropping arrangements. Unlike in the Ethiopian 
case, where sharecropping was the more common rental form, fixed rentals was more common in 
Kenya. The prevalence of land markets varied across the 15 districts in the sample. Regarding 
purchases for example, fewer than 10% of the plots were purchased in two of the districts while 
more than 30% were purchased in four of the districts. The highest incidence occurred in the 
Nakuru District, where 52% of the plots were purchased. Regarding rentals, less than 10% of the 
plots had been rented in eight of the fifteen districts, but in three, the proportion of rented plots 
was greater than 20%. 
As is typically found in other empirical studies in Africa, and similar to the Ethiopian 
case, rented plots have been more recently acquired than others. The average age of a rented plot 
was 4 years, as compared to 24 years for both purchased and inherited land. Another expected 
finding is that rented plots are smaller than owned plots. The average size of rented plots was just 
0.34 ha as compared to 0.98 ha for inherited plots. Purchased plots averaged 1.25 ha in size, 
which was significantly greater than the average size of inherited plots. Interestingly, the 
percentage of purchased plots in households headed by females was the same as in those headed 
by males. This does not mean that women are active buyers of land however, since many of the 
purchased plots were acquired two decades ago when their husbands may still have been around. 
On the other hand, the percentage of rented plots was only 10% in female-headed households as 
compared to 15% for male headed households, suggesting that it is easier for males to participate 
in land rental markets. 
Similar to the Ethiopian case too, there were significant differences in the rights 
associated with the different types of plot. For example, the right to sell and give land was much 
more limited with rented plots, as expected. However, there were some cases (about 20% of   10 
rented plots) with restricted rights (i.e. right to sell or give with approval), which likely refer to 
cases where the tenant was renting from another family member. Individualized rights of sale 
were stronger with respect to purchased plots than inherited plots. About 83% of purchased plots 
could be sold by the household head alone or after consultation with the nuclear family, as 
opposed to 64% of inherited plots. Regarding the rights to plant trees, a notable visible and long-
term investment, they were completely absent for 72% of the rented plots. On the other hand, 
households had strong rights to plant trees on at least 90% of inherited and purchased plots. 
Kenya has had a widespread land registration and titling program and so it is interesting 
to examine differences across systems. Focusing on purchased and inherited land, the differences 
between the two are striking. All purchased plots were claimed to be titled whereas about 14% of 
the inherited plots had no title. Furthermore, of the titled purchased plots, 84% were titled in the 
name of the household head or spouse. Of the inherited plots, on the other hand, only 47% were 
under title of the household head or spouse, and almost 35% was still titled in the name of a 
parent of the household head or spouse. This does suggest that there is a much stronger incentive 
to update the registration and title status of purchased plots. However, whether a current title 
confers stronger tenure security is an empirical issue; it may be that the lack of updating of land 
titles on inherited land is because the holders already feel sufficiently secure. One particular 
concern is the tenure security of women or female-headed households. Across all plots operated 
in female-headed households, a worrying 22% were titled in the name of a deceased husband. 
Although the problem is worse for inherited plots than purchased plots, it is not possible to 
confirm which of the many possible explanations are the most relevant, including that sons may 
have already laid claim to previously purchased plots. 
Compared to the Ethiopian case, average rental values were much higher, ranging 
between $10 and $525 per ha, with a mean of $83.
11 The value of rented and purchased land was 
estimated to be the same, but both were greater (about 20% more) than the estimated rental value 
of inherited plots. The stated rental values on rented plots are obviously informed by and 
                                                                 
11 At the time of the surveys, US$ 1»Kenyan Shillings 75.   11 
strongly correlated with actual prices paid. It may be that respondents believe that market prices 
for land rentals are somewhat fixed in their locations, hence the somewhat small differences in 
the estimated values.  
Uganda 
In Uganda, there are four major land tenure types (customary, mailo, freehold and leasehold) and 
each type has its own associated land rights and obligations (Republic of Uganda, 1998) and 
sense of tenure security. Customary land tenure, as the name implies, is regulated by customary 
rules and is the most common land tenure system in Uganda and often involves limitations on the 
holder’s right to sell or mortgage land, though usufruct and bequest rights are usually secure. 
Transfer of rights under this system is mainly through inheritance and landholders require 
approval of clan chiefs regarding any land transaction. However, under the 1998 Land Act 
(Republic of Uganda, 1998), a customary landholder may apply for a certificate of ownership 
from the District Land Board and, once such a certificate is issued, the landholder may lease, 
mortgage, sell, give away or bequeath the land by will. Under the freehold land tenure system, 
the landholder is allowed to own the land for an unlimited time and can use it for any lawful 
purposes, including sell, lease or use it as collateral to obtain a loan. This form of tenure provides 
holders with the most complete rights and the least bundle of obligations or restrictions on use. 
The mailo land tenure system is similar to the freehold system in the sense that the landholder is 
allowed to own the land for an unlimited time. However, in most cases, mailo land tends to been 
occupied by their holders over a period of time. The leasehold land tenure system, which is 
similar to the case of Ethiopia and Kenya, has the smallest bundle of land rights. 
Similar to the Kenya case, land markets in Uganda have been allowed to develop without 
much intervention from the government. About 34% of the plots surveyed were purchased and 
57% inherited (Table 1). Unlike in Kenya, however, rentals were not common, with only 2% of 
the plots being acquired through sharecropping arrangements. In general, land transactions are 
informal, as they involve little legal recourse (Rugadya, 2003). Hence, one of the objectives of   12 
the Land Act of 1998 is to formalize the land market, with a proposal to convert customary land 
to freehold status (Republic of Uganda, 1998). 
Consistent with the case of Ethiopia and Kenya, the data show that male-headed 
households were more likely to buy or lease in land than their female counterparts. This is 
expected since female-headed households have lower per capita household income (Nkonya et 
al., 2005). Female-headed households were more likely to borrow land than male-headed 
households, which also is expected, since poor households tend to have strong social capital, 
which helps them to acquire capital and services. With average buying and rental price of land 
estimated at about $285 and $27 per ha,
12 respectively, land markets are likely to increase the 
inequality of land between male and female headed households. Surprisingly, the share of female 
and male headed households who acquired land through inheritance was not significantly 
different (58% and 56% for female and male headed households, respectively). Given that most 
customary institutions encourage household heads to bequeath their land to their sons (Bikaako 
and Ssenkumba, 2003), it was expected that a significantly lower share of female-headed 
households will acquire their land through inheritance.  
3.2. Land markets and land investments 
The presence of long-term land investments on the plots surveyed across the three countries was 
generally low (Table 2). In the Amhara region of Ethiopia, the most common types of 
investment, in terms of proportion of plots having them, were drainage ditches followed by stone 
terraces and constructed fences. While the incidence of stone terraces, live fences and trees was 
significantly higher on owner-cultivated plots compared to rented plots, the incidence of 
drainage ditches was lower. In fact, there were no trees on rented plots. In Kenya, the most 
significant types of investments were trees, with the density of trees being three to eight times 
greater on inherited and purchased plots than on rented plots (Table 2). In fact, the density of 
trees was similar on inherited and purchased plots except in the case of coffee, where the density 
                                                                 
12 The standard deviations of these estimates are quite large, and land in the high potential area in the central region 
is likely to be more expensive than the case in the northern and northwestern marginal areas.   13 
was higher on inherited plots. In Uganda also, tree planting was the most common type of 
investment and, here too, the incidence was greater on purchased plots than the other types of 
plot (Table 2). Similar to the case of Ethiopia, differences in the other types of investment across 
plot types were mixed. For example, while the incidence of stone walls was significantly higher 
on inherited plots than purchased plots, the incidence of soil bunds was significantly higher on 
rented plots than purchased plots. 
Together, however, these results reflect the relative long-term versus short-term return to 
different types of investment, where those with longer-term benefits such as trees are preferred 
on more tenure-secure plots, while those with immediate or shorter-term benefits such as 
drainage structures are preferred on rented plots. The mixed results also indicate that there are 
other factors that influence the decision to invest in land improvement. 
3.3. Land markets and land management practices 
Compared to the types of land investment discussed in the previous section, household tended to 
engage more in various short-term land management practices across the three countries, 
although the incidence of occurrence was generally higher in Ethiopia compared to Uganda. In 
Ethiopia, the most common practices included contour plowing, plowing in crop residues, and 
crop rotation (Table 3). Notable differences across different types of plot was for contour 
plowing, where the incidence was higher on gifted and inherited plots than on PA-allocated and 
rented plots. Chemical fertilizers, household refuse, manure and improved seeds were used on 9–
35%. Application of household refuse and manure was higher on owner-cultivated than rented 
plots, while use of chemical fertilizers and improved seeds was higher on rented plots. It is likely 
that renters have more resources including access to credit to finance the purchase and use of 
chemical fertilizers and improved seeds, which is consistent with our distribution effect 
hypothesis. Also, since sharing the cost of purchased inputs is a common feature associated with 
sharecropping arrangements, the cost (and risk) of applying chemical fertilizers and improved   14 
seeds is reduced for each party, which increases the likelihood of using chemical fertilizers and 
improved seeds on rented (sharecropped in this case) plots. 
In Kenya, the incidence of manuring and mulching, as well as the average amount of 
manure applied, was greater on purchased and inherited plots than rented plots (Table 3). 
However, fertilizer use and amounts applied were similar across all types of plots. In Uganda 
too, the incidence of application of mulch, animal manure, compost and household refuse was 
higher on purchased plots (and in several instances inherited plots as well) than on rented plots, 
while application of chemical fertilizers and herbicides was higher on rented plots than the others 
(Table 3). Regarding other practices, slash and burn tended to be used more on borrowed and 
rented plots, while fallowing was used more on inherited and purchased plots. 
Again, these results reflect the relative long-term versus short-term return to different 
types of management practices, where those with longer-term benefits such as manuring, 
mulching and composting are preferred on more tenure-secure plots while those with immediate 
or season-to-season benefits such as chemical fertilizers are preferred on rented plots. 
An interesting observation with the Kenya data is that differences in some of the land 
investment and management practices seem to have a bearing on land rental values. For example, 
although estimated land rental values were not significantly related to investments in timber or 
coffee, they were positively correlated to the number of tea bushes on the plot. Rental values also 
were higher by about 20% and 40% for plots receiving manure and mineral fertilizer application, 
respectively. Land sales value also was significantly correlated with all types of investments,
13 
and land sales prices were also 40% and 66% higher on plots that were manured and fertilized, 
respectively. 
3.4. Land markets and agricultural productivity and land quality 
                                                                 
13 We treat these results with some caution because the mean reported sales values were about 200 times the rental 
values. Although it is known that land sales costs are very high in rural Kenya, the lack of high sales activity in 
some areas may have lead to some inflation of values.   15 
With very little irrigation (see Table 2), crop production was restricted to the main rainy season, 
and cereals seem to dominate the crops cultivated. In Ethiopia for example, teff and maize were 
dominant on rented plots. As Table 4 shows, in Ethiopia, there was no statistically significant 
difference in productivity across the different types of plot. In Kenya, however, average maize 
yield was significantly higher on purchased plots than on inherited and rented plots. In Uganda 
also, the value of crop production per ha was larger on purchased and inherited plots compared 
to borrowed and rented plots. In fact, the value of output per ha was nearly twice as much on 
purchased plots than on rented plots. 
In terms of land quality, we examine farmers’ perception of erosion problems in Ethiopia 
and actual soil fertility and nutrient measures in Kenya and Uganda.
14  Farmers in Ethiopia in 
general perceived a majority of their plots as having little or no erosion problems, but these 
perceptions were not significantly different across plot types (Table 4). Regarding the more 
rigorous land quality measures associated with the Kenya and Uganda data, however, we find 
some significant differences. In Kenya, inherited plots were the most fertile, followed by 
purchased plots. Rented plots were the least fertile. In Uganda, the analyses show that purchased 
plots had the greatest nutrient stocks (N, P and K in kg/ha) than all other types of plot, with 
borrowed plots faring the worst. These results from Kenya and Uganda support the hypothesis 
that plots traded on short-term markets tend to be of inferior quality, due to market 
imperfections. However in Uganda also, the N and P balances (in kg/ha/yr) for the purchased 
plots were lower than those measured for plots acquired through other methods, suggesting that 
purchased plots experience more severe nitrogen and potassium depletion than plots acquired by 
other methods, despite the seemingly better land management practices associated with 
purchased plots that was discussed previously. But recall that purchased plots also were 
associated with significantly greater extractive activities in terms of output per ha. 
                                                                 
14 For the Kenya data soil samples taken from farmers’ plots were analyzed using new spectroscopy methods 
developed at the World Agroforestry Center. The results, in addition to others from  analysis of many thousands of 
other soil samples, was then used to develop a soil fertility index, centered around zero with negative values being 
less fertile than positive ones, and applied to the data. In Uganda, soil nutrient (nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P) and 
potassium (K)) stocks and balances were estimated of soil samples taken from farmers’ plots.   16 
4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
Impact of land markets on land investments 
Regression analyses to examine the impact of land markets in long-term land investments were 
undertaken for the Tigray region and Kenya datasets only. Interestingly in Ethiopia, investment 
in stone terrace is predicted to be less likely on PA-allocated plots than on the other types of plot, 
though the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10% level (Table 5). Given that 
sharecropping and other lease arrangements are restricted to be no more than two years in Tigray 
(Gebremedhin et al., 2002), this result may appear surprising. However, a substantial share of the 
investments made in stone terraces were made by the community as a whole under mass-
mobilization campaigns requiring people to contribute labor to soil and water conservation 
measures in the community.
15  Such investments are apparently not affected by the tenure 
category of the land. Furthermore, private land investments are almost always made by the 
landowner, even if the land is leased to a tenant. Thus, the short duration of tenancy contracts 
may not significantly inhibit soil and water conservation investments. With regards to Kenya, 
Table 5 also shows that while purchased plots, compared to inherited plots, were associated with 
greater investment in timber trees, they were also associated with lower investment in coffee 
bunches. In general, rented plots were associated with much lower investment in trees of all 
types, which supports our hypotheses on capitalization and tenure security effects. 
Impact of land markets on land management practices 
Table 6 shows regression results of the impact of land markets on use of various land 
management practices across the three countries. Controlling for several other factors that may 
affect invest in land improvement, the results are mixed, sometimes surprising but, in many 
cases, consistent with our expectations. In the Amhara region of Ethiopia for example, compared 
to rented plots, inherited plots were associated with lower likelihood of using reduced tillage, 
while PA-allocated and gifted plots were associated with greater likelihood of using crop rotation 
                                                                 
15  In Tigray, adults are required to contribute 20 days per year to labor mass-mobilization campaigns, which focus 
mainly on soil and water conservation investment (Hagos et al., 1999).   17 
and plowing in crop residues, respectively. However, rented plots were associated with greater 
likelihood of applying manure and using improved seeds than on other types of plot. These 
results are consistent with our hypotheses on tenure security and distribution effects. 
In the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we find that, compared to rented plots, PA-allocated 
plots were associated with lower likelihood being contour plowed, gifted plots were associated 
with more slash and burn, while inherited plots were associated with more use manure and 
fertilizers. Perhaps recipients of gift plots, and renters to some extent, are expected to use such 
conservation measures in deference to the landowner who provided the land. 
In Kenya, we find that rented plots were less likely to receive manure or mulching and, 
for plots that received fertilizer, they were associated with lower amounts. Because mulching and 
manure are expected to have effects over multiple seasons, the latter finding is sensible and 
expected. However, it is not clear why rented plots received less fertilizer amounts given that 
they were equally likely to have received fertilizer, but this may have to do with the wealth effect 
of those renting in lands (e.g. they may be labor rich but capital poor). 
In the case of Uganda, purchased plots were generally more likely to have better land 
management practices than plots acquired through other methods, and many of the significant 
differences relate to purchased versus borrowed plots. The results in Table 6 show that slash and 
burn was more likely to be practiced on borrowed plots than on purchased plots, probably 
because farmers temporarily give away undeveloped plots in order to get help to clear the land. 
Borrowed plots also were less likely than purchased plots to be fallowed, receive fertilizer, 
animal manure, household residues and pesticides, and for crop rotation to be practiced. This is 
expected and is likely due to the short-term perspective that land borrowers tend to have, hence 
lower incentive to invest in long-term land improvement. To the extent that lessees seek to rent 
in more developed plots, the finding that slash and burn was less likely to be practiced on leased 
in plots than on purchased plots (Table 6) is also not surprising. Consistent with the above 
findings regarding borrowed plots, other regression results show that labor input on borrowed 
plots was significantly lower that the amount used on purchased plots.   18 
Impact of land markets on land productivity 
Results of the impact of land markets on land productivity are given in Table 7. In the Amhara 
region of Ethiopia, we find that owner-cultivated (PA-allocated, gift and inherited) plots, 
compared to rented plots, were associated with lower value of crop yield by about 33–66%. This 
result is puzzling as it contradicts the tendency of yields being lower on rented plots (Otsuka and 
Hayami, 1988). It also contradicts the results from the Tigray region of Ethiopia and Kenya, 
where land markets had no observed significant impact on land productivity, controlling for 
other factors (see also Table 7). The results from the Amhara region also contradicts findings 
from other parts of Ethiopia in the Oromiya region (Pender and Fafchamps, 2001; Ahmed et al., 
2002). Pender and Fafchamps (2001) found no difference in yields between owner-cultivated and 
sharecropped plots, while Ahmed et al. (2002) found that crop yields were lower on 
sharecropped plots than on owner-cultivated plots. The result is puzzling also because the 
econometric results do not show much consistent and statistical significant difference in land 
management practices and inputs between owner-cultivated and rented plots. Although, the 
result is consistent with some of the findings of Holden et al. (2001), who found that barley yield 
was about 51% higher on rented plots, the puzzle was addressed by re-estimating the value of 
crop yield regression using a household fixed-effects model and also by restricting the sample to 
households operating both owner-cultivated and rented plots only.
16  The results of these 
estimations show that the negative impact associated with the different types of owner-cultivated 
plots is robust only for gifted plots. Note, however, that there is substantial loss of information 
(i.e. dropping several variables in the fixed-effects model and observations in the restricted 
sample) associated with these models, and so they should be interpreted with caution. 
In the case of Uganda, we find that, compared with purchased plots, rented plots were 
significantly associated with a lower value of crop yield (Table 7), which is consistent with our 
expectations. Surprisingly, borrowed plots, compared with purchased plots, were associated with 
                                                                 
16 In the household fixed-effects model, all variables that do not vary across plots (on within the household) are 
dropped. Thanks to Kei Otsuka for suggesting these methods for addressing the puzzle.   19 
a higher value of crop yield, although the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10% 
level. The later contradicts the finding of Nkonya et al. (2004) that purchased plots had higher 
value of crop yield than inherited plots and borrowed plots. 
Impact of land markets on land quality 
Here, the analysis is based on the Kenya and Uganda datasets, since the land quality measures 
are based on actual soils sample analysis, as opposed to perception of farmers in the case of 
Ethiopia datasets. Regarding Kenya, we find that much of the variation in soil fertility is 
explained by meso level factors, as district dummies in our regression picked up nearly 60% of 
the variation. However, the micro factors do explain a significant portion, as we find that rented 
plots are less fertile than inherited and purchased plots (Table 7). This also supports the 
hypothesis that due to market imperfections, plots that are transacted on short-term markets tend 
to be of inferior quality than others. 
Results associated with the Uganda data are mixed. The nitrogen balance on rented plots 
was significantly higher than the balance on purchased plots, while the phosphorus and 
potassium balances were lower on inherited plots than on purchased plots. The former supports 
the distribution effect hypothesis of movement of land to households with higher capital/land 
ratios. But it may also be an outcome effect due to the higher crop productivity on purchased 
plots. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Using community, household and plot level survey data from the highland areas of Ethiopia, 
Kenya and Uganda, this paper examined the efficiency and sustainability impacts of land 
markets. Land rental markets (including sales and short-term rentals) were more developed in 
Kenya and Uganda than in Ethiopia. With the existing ban on land sales in Ethiopia, short-term 
rentals, mainly through sharecropping arrangements, were used. Land sales were common in 
both Kenya and Uganda, but short-term rentals were more common in Ethiopia and Kenya than 
in Uganda.   20 
Regarding the impact of the different types of plot on land investments and management 
practices, both descriptive and econometric analysis generally highlight the relative long-term 
versus short-term return to different types of investment and practices, where those with longer-
term benefits such as trees, manuring, mulching and composting are preferred on more tenure-
secure plots (especially purchased, distributed by the community, or inherited), while those with 
immediate or season-to-season benefits such as drainage structures or chemical fertilizers are 
preferred on rented plots. In cases where the latter did not hold, it may have to do with the wealth 
effect of those renting in lands (e.g. they may be labor rich but capital poor). 
The impact of land markets on agricultural productivity was mixed: surprising in the 
Amhara region of Ethiopia (owner-cultivated plots were associated with lower value of crop 
yield), no impact in the Tigray region of Ethiopia and Kenya, and partially expected in Uganda 
(purchased plots were associated with greater value of crop yield than rented plots, while 
borrowed plots were associated with a greater value of crop yield than purchased plots). These 
suggest that the impact of land markets on agricultural productivity is context specific. 
Regarding land quality outcomes, we found that inherited and purchased plots were 
relatively more fertile than rented plots in Kenya, suggesting that plots traded on short-term 
markets in Kenya tend to be of inferior quality, due to market imperfections. In Uganda, the 
results were mixed. The nitrogen balance on rented plots was significantly higher than the 
balance on purchased plots, while the phosphorus and potassium balances were lower on 
inherited plots than on purchased plots. The former supports the distribution effect hypothesis of 
movement of land to households with higher capital/land ratios. But it may also be an outcome 
effect due to the higher extractive activities (output per ha) on purchased plots. 
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Table 1. Land acquisition methods in East Africa (percentage of plots) 
Tenure/Plot acquisition method          Ethiopia  Kenya  Uganda 




   
Owned         
Purchased  --  --  26.1  34.4 
Allocated by community (Peasant Association)  72.4  84.0  --  -- 
Inherited, other permanent acquisition (e.g. exchange)  6.8  1.4  58.8  56.9 
Gift  10.6  0.9  --  -- 
Rented         
Sharecrop  9.9  13.0  0.3  2.0 
Fixed rent  0.5  0.7  14.1  -- 
Other temporary acquisition (e.g. borrowed, squatting)  0.4  --  0.7  6.7 
Sources of data: Community and household surveys in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (see text for details). 
 
 
Table 2. Land investments by method of plot acquisition in East Africa 
Type of investment  All plots  Method of plot acquisition  t-test 
    Owner-cultivated  Borrowed  Rented 
 
    Purchased  PA-
allocated 
Gift  Inherited     
 
Ethiopia (Amhara 
region) (% of plots) 
   
         
 
Stone terrace  21.9  --  23.6  16.0  36.8  --  9.0 
a,c,f 
Soil bund    3.2  --  3.4  2.9  1.2  --  2.7 
 
Check dam    1.4  --  1.4  3.5  0.0  --  0.0 
a,e 
Drainage ditch  39.2  --  39.0  33.6  35.5  --  58.5 
a,b,c 
Grass strip    4.9  --  5.2  7.7  0.6  --  2.6 
e,f 
Trees    2.8  --  2.3  7.3  6.2  --  0.0 
a,b 
Constructed fence  16.2  --  13.6  28.8  24.7  --  23.0 
a,d 
Live fence  12.5  --  11.4  27.3  26.0  --  2.7 
a,b,c,d,e 
Irrigation  4.0  --  3.1  6.5  11.8  --  3.1 
 
Kenya (number/ha)               
 
Timber trees  158.0  193.0  --  --  172.0  --  49.3 
a,c 
Fruit trees  15.8  18.8  --  --  23.5  --  5.8 
a,c 
Coffee bushes  114.0  90.3  --  --  147.0  --  38.5 
a,c 
Tea bushes  438.5  306.0  --  --  581.8  --  171.8 
a,c 
Uganda (% of plots)               
 
Bench terrace  6.1  6.1  --  --  6.3  6.0  1.8 
 
Fanya juu terrace  0.1  0.2  --  --  0.0  0.0  0.0 
 
Fanya chini terrace  0.3  0.3  --  --  0.3  0  0 
 
Soil bunds  1.0  1.1  --  --  0.9  0.6  1.9 
a 
Stone wall  0.7  0.3  --  --  1.0  0  0 
e 
Trenches  9.5  8.8  --  --  10.5  5.7  6.5 
f 
Grass strips  2.5  2.7  --  --  2.5  0  3.7 
d,f 
Planted trees  14.3  16.9  --  --  13.3  8.6  4.6 
a,c,d,e 
Irrigation well  0.1  0.0  --  --  0  0  1.9 
a,b,c 
Paired tests for significant difference at the 10% level: 
a is rented vs. purchased/PA-allocated; 
b is for rented vs. gift/borrowed; 
c is 
for rented vs. inherited; 
d is purchased/PA-allocated vs. gift/borrowed; 
e is for purchased/PA-allocated vs. inherited; and 
f is for 
gift/borrowed vs. inherited. 
Sources of data: Community and household surveys in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (see text for details). 
 
 
Table 3. Land management practices by method of plot acquisition in East Africa 
Type of practice  All plots  Method of plot acquisition  t-test   24 
    Owner-cultivated  Borrowed  Rented 
 
    Purchased  PA-
allocated 
Gift  Inherited     
 
Ethiopia (Amhara 
region) (% of plots) 
   
         
 
Reduced tillage  25.2  --  26.8  22.4  4.7  --  19.6 
c,e,f 
Contour plowing  69.3  --  67.1  87.5  91.0  --  69.4 
b,c,d,e 
Crop rotation  62.4  --  67.1  41.1  53.6  --  46.9 
a,d 
Crop residues  64.0  --  66.8  61.0  46.5  --  57.4 
e 
Household refuse  17.4  --  17.5  29.4  26.7  --  3.6 
a,b,c,d 
Manure    9.0  --  7.1  24.7  19.5  --  2.6 
a,b,c,d,e 
Fertilizers  34.5  --  35.1  19.0  17.6  --  59.2 
a,b,c,d,e 
Improved seeds  13.0  --  12.3  4.4  11.7  --  25.0 
a,b,d 
Kenya (% of plots)               
 
Mulching  16.1  16.7  --  --  18.7  --  4.8 
a,c,e 
Manure  66.7  70.9  --  --  72.4  --  36.7 
a,c,e 
Fertilizers  74.3  76.7  --  --  73.3  --  79.4 
 
Kenya (kg/ha)               
 
    Manure  1377.5  1425.0  --  --  1437.5  --  962.5 
a,c 
    Fertilizers  56.0  55.8  --  --  55.0  --  61.3 
 
Uganda (% of plots)               
 
Slash and burn  16.7  14.7  --  --  17.4  20.8  20.6 
d,e 
Fallow  20.9  17.9  --  --  24.1  11.7  13.1 
c,d,e,f 
Crop rotation  28.6  30.3  --  --  27.3  25.9  35.5 
 
Crop residues  17.1  18.6  --  --  16.0  15.1  24.3 
e 
Mulch  3.3  4.3  --  --  2.9  2.4  0.9 
e 
Compost  1.3  1.9  --  --  1.2  0.3  0.0 
d 
Household refuse  4.6  6.3  --  --  3.9  0.8  1.8 
d,e,f 
Manure  8.1  10.8  --  --  7.5  0.5  8.1 
a,d,e,f 
Inorganic fertilizer  2.1  1.9  --  --  2.3  0.5  3.6 
 
Pesticides  2.4  2.4  --  --  2.2  4.1  0.0 
b 
Herbicides  2.9  3.9  --  --  2.4  1.4  7.2 
b,c,e 
Paired tests for significant difference at the 10% level: 
a is rented vs. purchased/PA-allocated; 
b is for rented vs. gift/borrowed; 
c is 
for rented vs. inherited; 
d is purchased/PA-allocated vs. gift/borrowed; 
e is for purchased/PA-allocated vs. inherited; and 
f is for 
gift/borrowed vs. inherited. 
Sources of data: Community and household surveys in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (see text for details). 
 
 
Table 4. Land productivity and quality by method of plot acquisition in East Africa 
Type of practice  All plots  Method of plot acquisition  t-test 
    Owner-cultivated  Borrowed  Rented 
 
    Purchased  PA-
allocated 
Gift  Inherited     
 
Ethiopia (Amhara region)               
 
Value of crop yield 
(US$/ha)
1 
332.8  --  294.0  508.2  673.2  --  282.0 
 
Perceived erosion 
problem (% of plots) 
             
 
None  53.9  --  52.7  60.3  64.8  --  52.6 
 
Moderate  37.9  --  38.3  32.3  26.0  --  44.0 
 
Severe  8.2  --  9.0  7.4  9.2  --  3.4 
 
Kenya               
 
Maize yield (kg/ha)  694  801  --  --  640  --  698 
a,e 
Soil fertility index   0.004  0.002  --  --  0.005  --  -0.003 
a,c,e 
Uganda               
   25 
Value of crop yield 
(US$/ha)
1 
141.9  155.2  --  --  140.4  108.8  77.7 
d 
Nitrogen (kg/ha)    4353.0  --  --  3697.0  3663.0  4038.0 
d,e 
Phosphorus (kg/ha)    2762.0  --  --  2437.0  1904.0  2389.0 
d,e, f 
Potassium (kg/ha)    8223.0  --  --  6788.0  6591.0  6528.0 
d,e 
Nitrogen (kg/ha/yr)    -84.9  --  --  –77.3  –65.5  –49.8 
d 
Phosphorus (kg/ha/yr)    -14.0  --  --  –16.7  –10.7  –10.7 
f 
Potassium (kg/ha/yr)    -90.8  --  --  –85.4  –53.5  –55.1 
d, f 
Notes: 
Sample means are adjusted for stratification, weighting and clustering of sample. 
1 At the time of the surveys, US$ 1»8.50 Ethiopian Birr, 1800 Ugandan Shillings, 75 Kenyan Shillings. 
Paired tests for significant difference at the 10% level: 
a is rented vs. purchased/PA-allocated; 
b is for rented vs. gift/borrowed; 
c is 
for rented vs. inherited; 
d is purchased/PA-allocated vs. gift/borrowed; 
e is for purchased/PA-allocated vs. inherited; and 
f is for 
gift/borrowed vs. inherited. 
Sources of data: Community and household surveys in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (see text for details). 
 
 






Stone terraces (probit)         
Purchased         
PA-allocated  –0.056 *     
Gift  –0.073      
Inherited  0.032      
Borrowed         
Rented         
Timber trees per acre (tobit)         
Purchased      20.04 * 
PA-allocated        
Gift        
Inherited        
Borrowed        
Rented      -32.08 ** 
Fruit trees per acre (tobit)        
Purchased      .789  
PA-allocated        
Gift        
Inherited        
Borrowed        
Rented      -4.52 *** 
Coffee bushes per acre (tobit)        
Purchased      -10.98 * 
PA-allocated        
Gift        
Inherited        
Borrowed        
Rented      -29.96 *** 
Tea bushes per acre (tobit)
        
Purchased      4.64  
PA-allocated        
Gift        
Inherited         
Borrowed         
Rented      -125.72 ***   26 
1 Omitted category for the explanatory variable is rented; 
2 Omitted category for the explanatory variable is purchased; 
3 Omitted 
category for the explanatory variable is inherited. *, ** and *** mean coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
Sources of data: Community and household surveys in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (see text for details). 
 
 







  Amhara Region  Tigray Region         
Fallow (probit)                
Purchased                
PA-allocated                
Gift                
Inherited             -0.045   
Borrowed             -1.57  *** 
Rented             -0.346   
Slash and burn (probit)                
Purchased                
PA-allocated     0.004          
Gift     0.178 *         
Inherited     0.081       0.416   
Borrowed             1.388  *** 
Rented             -2.153  *** 
Reduced tillage (probit)                
Purchased                
PA-allocated  –0.257   –0.026          
Gift  –0.565   –0.028          
Inherited  –1.788 ***  –0.043          
Borrowed                
Rented                
Contour plowing (probit)                
Purchased                
PA-allocated  –0.159   –0.060 ***         
Gift  0.435   + 
c         
Inherited  0.109   0.041          
Borrowed                
Rented                
Crop rotation (probit)                
Purchased                
PA-allocated  0.604 **             
Gift  0.128              
Inherited  0.200           0.012   
Borrowed             -1.153  *** 
Rented             0.356   
Crop residues (probit)                
Purchased                
PA-allocated  0.100              
Gift  0.582 *             
Inherited  –0.520           -0.012   
Borrowed             -0.365   
Rented             0.533 
 
Mulch (probit)                
Purchased         0.144      
PA-allocated               
Gift                  27 
Inherited             -0.333   
Borrowed             0.734   
Rented         -1.280 ***  0.238   
Household refuse (probit)                
Purchased                
PA-allocated  0.050              
Gift  –0.744              
Inherited  –0.169           -0.489   
Borrowed             -6.789  *** 
Rented             -1.368   
Manure (probit)                
Purchased         0.156      
PA-allocated  –0.910 **  0.018         
Gift  –0.490   0.365 **         
Inherited  –0.901 *  0.132 *      0.430   
Borrowed             -6.446  *** 
Rented         -1.414 ***  -5.488  *** 
Use of fertilizers (probit)               
Purchased                
PA-allocated  0.515   0.020   -0.001      
Gift  –0.036   –0.162         
Inherited  –0.145   0.289 *      0.078   
Borrowed             -5.638  ** 
Rented         -0.152   -1.707  * 
Fertilizers (kg/acre) (tobit)                
Purchased         3.275      
PA-allocated               
Gift                
Inherited                
Borrowed                
Rented         -12.894 ***     
Use of improved seeds (probit)                
Purchased                
PA-allocated  –0.871 **  0.001          
Gift  –1.533 ***  – 
c         
Inherited  –1.064 *  0.013          
Borrowed                
Rented                
Use of pesticides (probit)                
Purchased                
PA-allocated                
Gift                
Inherited             -0.123   
Borrowed             -1.550  *** 
Rented             -0.488 
 
1 Omitted category for the explanatory variable is rented; 
2 Omitted category for the explanatory variable is purchased; 
3 Omitted 
category for the explanatory variable is inherited. *, ** and *** mean coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
Sources of data: Community and household surveys in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (see text for details). 
 
 







  Amhara Region  Tigray Region         
Crop yield
4 (OLS)                 28 
Purchased         21.570      
PA-allocated  –0.288 **  0.016         
Gift  –0.505 ***  –0.046         
Inherited  –0.360 **  0.368      1.660  * 
Borrowed            3.610   
Rented         -71.120   -6.45  ** 
Soil fertility level (OLS)                
Purchased         0.001      
PA-allocated               
Gift                
Inherited                
Borrowed                
Rented         -0.003 ***   
 
Soil nutrient balances (OLS)                
Nitrogen (kg/ha)                
Purchased                
PA-allocated               
Gift               
Inherited            -5.020   
Borrowed             12.820   
Rented             20.410  ** 
Phosphorus (kg/ha)            
   
Purchased                
PA-allocated               
Gift      
         
Inherited            -2.330  ** 
Borrowed            0.020   
Rented            -1.790   
Potassium (kg/ha)           
   
Purchased               
PA-allocated               
Gift               
Inherited            -14.290  * 
Borrowed             12.920   
Rented             -1.980   
1 Omitted category for the explanatory variable is rented; 
2 Omitted category for the explanatory variable is purchased; 
3 Omitted 
category for the explanatory variable is inherited. *, ** and *** mean coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
4 This is natural logarithm of the value of total crop output per ha in Ethiopia and Uganda; and cereal yield (kg/ha) in Kenya. 
Sources of data: Community and household surveys in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (see text for details). 
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Figure 1. Conceptual model of land markets, investment and efficiency and inventory of possible effects. 
More long-term investment 
and productivity on all plots 
Increased land market activity: 
permanent and short-term 
transactions 
Capitalization Effect: 
Capitalization of investments 
into land; Increased incentives 
for visible and lumpy 
investment 
Higher investment and 
productivity on plots 
acquired through markets 
Distribution Effect: 
Movement of plots to 
households with higher labor 
or capital to land ratios 
Tenure Security Effect 
Purchases  Rentals/Sharecrop 
Increased demand 
for titling; Increased 
long-term investment 
Short duration of 
rights and restrictions 
from landlord lead to 
lower investment 
Asymmetric Information Effect 
Purchases  Rentals/Sharecrop 
Increased incentive to 
assess quality of plots 
sold; Increased 
quality of plots – 
higher productivity 
 
Spontaneous nature of 
market leads to asymmetric 
information and trading of 
inferior quality plots – 
lower productivity 